Categories: PhilosophyNeurosciencePsychology

The ‘conjunction fallacy’ revisited: how intelligent inferences look like reasoning errors

Ralph Hertwig, Gerd Gigerenzer

DOI: 10.1002/(sici)1099-0771(199912)12:4<275::aid-bdm323>3.0.co;2-m

Journal-article published December 1999 in Journal of Behavioral Decision Making volume 12 issue 4 on page 275-305
© Wiley-Blackwell

Keywords: #conjunction fallacy   # probability judgment   # extensional versus intuitive reasoning   Edit keywords

1 0 4.0 Posted: 27.Aug.2017
Incognito 27.Aug.2017

Hertwig and Gigerenzer present an argument against the phrasing of the conjunction fallacy. By contrast propose that fallacies can be classified as such as a result of our failure to recognize the human capacity for semantic and pragmatic reasoning. They argue based on pragmatics and assert that we are able to act rationally within our environment and that fallacies are not representative of our reasoning.

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